Making European Diplomacy Work: Can the EEAS Deliver?  EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2011, December 2011 by Quinn, Paul
DEPARTMENT OF EU INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY STUDIES
Making European 
Diplomacy Work: 
Can the EEAS Deliver?
Paul Quinn (ed.)
EU Diplomacy Paper 08 / 20111 
 
 
Department of EU International Relations 
and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
E EU U   D Di ip pl lo om ma ac cy y   P Pa ap pe er rs s   
8 8/ /2 20 01 11 1   
 
 
 
 
 
Making European Diplomacy Work: 
Can the EEAS Deliver? 
 
 
Paul Quinn (ed.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Paul Quinn 2011 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurop.be | www.coleurope.eu/ird  Paul Quinn (ed.) 
  2 
About the Authors 
 
The contributors to this paper are recent graduates or Academic Assistants from the 
Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies at the College of 
Europe in Bruges, Belgium (Albert Einstein Promotion 2011).  
Benjamin BARTON (United Kingdom) is a PhD candidate at King’s College London 
and Hong Kong University. From 2009 to 2011 he was Research Assistant for the InBev-
Baillet-Latour Chair of European Union-China Relations at the College of Europe. He 
holds an MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies from the College of 
Europe and a BA in European Studies from the University of Sussex in Brighton, UK. 
Florian BERGMÜLLER (Germany) holds an Inter-University MA in Diplomacy and Inter-
national Relations from the Diplomatic School of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Cooperation  in Madrid, Spain,  and an MA  in EU International Relations and 
Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe.  
Clive CUSENS (Malta) holds a Bachelor’s degree (Honours) in International Relations 
from the University of Malta and an MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy 
Studies from the College of Europe. He is a founding member of the Malta Inter-
national Relations Student Association (MIRSA).  
Francesca FENTON (United Kingdom) is an Academic Assistant at the College of 
Europe in Bruges. She  holds an MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy 
Studies and an MA in Politics from the University of Edinburgh, UK.   
Thomas HEIDENER (Denmark) holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the 
University of Aarhus, Denmark, where he is also an MA student in Political Science. In 
2011 he obtained an MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies from 
the College of Europe. 
Raïssa MARTEAUX (Netherlands) holds a Bachelor’s degree in European Law and a 
Master’s degree in International and European Law from Maastricht University, 
Netherlands, as well as an MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies 
from the College of Europe. 
Paul QUINN (Ireland) was an Academic Assistant in the Department of EU Internatio-
nal Relations and Diplomacy Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges in 2010-2011. 
He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Politics and French from the University of Limerick, 
Ireland,  and an MSc in International and European Politics from the University of 
Edinburgh, UK.  
Charles THEPAUT (France) is  Research Assistant for the TOTAL  Chair of European 
Foreign Policy at the College of Europe. He graduated from the Department of EU 
International Relations and Diplomacy Studies at the College of Europe and from the 
Public Law Department of the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lille, France.  EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
  3 
Abstract 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) represents a formidable challenge for 
the European Union (EU) and marks the arrival of a veritable European diplomacy on 
the world stage. This paper examines some pertinent and often overlooked questions 
surrounding the launching of the EEAS, notably its impact on the traditional domains 
of European diplomacy, the introduction of European diplomats and the need to 
build an EEAS ‘esprit de corps’. Much has been discussed and debated regarding 
the EEAS on paper, nevertheless it is in the corridors of power and in EU Delegation 
meeting rooms where the real test lies for EU diplomats. Therefore,  the  actual 
question is: will the EEAS be able to deliver for EU diplomacy?  
Most  of the  essays in this collection were written in the context of the course 
‘Diplomacy Today: Theory and  Practice’ which was  taught by Fulbright Professor 
Alan Henrikson at the College of Europe in the academic year 2010-2011. Paul Quinn 
was the Academic Assistant for this course. 
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Making EU Diplomacy Work: Treaty Changes, Political Will and the ‘Quiet 
Diplomacy’ Strategy 
Benjamin Barton and Paul Quinn 
 
The world of international politics, despite its permanently evolving nature, is 
predominantly played by nation-states who set the diplomatic rules to the game. 
Within this constant state of flux, the European Union in proportion to its demographic 
or economic size has consistently struggled to translate this into a comparable level 
of influence. The causal links that explain this mismatch between the EU’s potential in 
abundance and its below par performances on the international stage run aplenty – 
from its sophisticated sui generis nature in a world of sovereign nation-states to the 
patchwork of  its  exclusive, shared or non-existent external competences –  all of 
which have been drawn to the attention of EU foreign policy-makers for some time.  
 
In order to remedy to these multiple discrepancies, policy-makers have resorted to 
Treaty-based policy innovations, the most important for EU diplomacy in this respect 
being the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in December 2009. On the face 
of it, the Lisbon Treaty can be labelled the defining moment in the making of EU 
diplomacy, due to the fact that it has established a new and quasi-autonomous 
institution  –  the European External Action Service  –  dedicated to serving the EU’s 
diplomatic needs and more succinctly, those of a high-level political figure, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP),  Lady 
Ashton. This oversimplified depiction has, from a top-down perspective, boosted the 
EU’s diplomatic credentials by formalising the developments of the EU’s own pseudo-
Foreign Minister and Foreign Ministry along supranational lines. This move thus serves 
to reduce the asymmetry of the EU’s nature to that of the dominant actors in world 
politics: nation-states.  
 
Yet, perhaps most importantly, the Lisbon Treaty has granted the EU the necessary 
resources and institutions with which to build-up its reputation as a diplomatic actor, 
sufficiently so in order for it to successfully play by these rules designed for and by 
nation-states without betraying its sui generis entity. As aforementioned, the EU’s lack 
of punch on the international stage can best be justified by its difference in status. 
However, on a macro level, the EU’s foreign policy has suffered as a result of the 
internal wrangling and competition amongst its institutions and Member States, by 
the plethora of actors representing the EU in foreign policy matters or by the 
generally scattered and incoherent nature of its external relations.1 Therefore, via the 
many changes brought about  by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is now able,  from a 
bottom-up perspective, to establish a more unified foreign policy due to the pooling 
                                                 
1 For more on the creation of the EEAS see Benjamin Barton, “The Emergence of the EEAS: A 
Retrospective on the Institutional Wrangling for the Soul of European Diplomacy”, in Dieter 
Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl (eds.), European Union Diplomacy: Coherence, Unity and 
Effectiveness, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, forthcoming. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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of staff, resources and institutions. The best example of this is the EEAS that brings 
together staff, expertise and know-how from across the Member States, the 
Commission and the Council Secretariat so as to reinforce foreign policy coherence. 
And it  will act as a much needed socialisation process in the creation of an EU 
diplomatic corps working towards the same foreign policy objectives. 
 
In turn, this unified and coherent approach should help to provide the EU with further 
leveraging power internationally, thus permitting it in the long term to punch within its 
weight – a fact that would garner the respect of the other actors making-up the 
international community. Consequently, the Lisbon Treaty has provided the compre-
hensive framework and the instruments necessary for  EU diplomacy. The issue at 
stake now is to make EU diplomacy work – a feat which will require above all a 
strong degree of political volition in order to support the EEAS and the HR/VP. The will 
to make EU diplomacy work inevitably concerns all the actors involved in the EU 
foreign policy-making process. Yet, a large proportion of the responsibility will rest 
upon the shoulders of the Member States, as without their backing or support Lady 
Ashton and the EEAS will struggle to implement the visionary strategies laid out at the 
inception of her term.  
 
Quiet Diplomacy 
 
As stated on the night of her appointment, Lady Ashton, whilst speaking to the 
world’s media, presented her vision for the external relations of the EU to be carried 
out by the EEAS using ‘quiet diplomacy’. On 17 December 2009, in her first article 
since taking the post, entitled “Quiet diplomacy will get our voice heard”, which was 
published in The Times  and  The New York Times  and picked up by several news 
agencies, the EU’s highest ranking diplomat states her belief in the effectiveness of 
this strategy. 2 However, in her vision of the EEAS, HR/VP Ashton remained ironically 
‘quiet’ on the actual mechanisms and tools of such a doctrine. In her article she 
stated: “I believe that a lot can be achieved with quiet diplomacy”, but made no 
reference to what it would  mean in practice and what techniques EU diplomats 
would employ to be in accord with the central vision for their purpose.3 Commen-
tators were quick to point  out the flaws in her vision;4 some argued that quiet 
diplomacy was not the best tool5 for a newly established organisation built on a 
treaty whose entire rationale is to  provide for greater EU presence on the global 
stage. During her confirmation hearing at the European Parliament on 11 January 
2010,  when  the HR/VP was questioned about her use of and belief in quiet 
diplomacy, she argued that “sometimes taking to people without full publicity can 
                                                 
2 Catherine Ashton, “Quiet diplomacy will get our voice heard”, The Times, 17 December 
2009. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See George Lyon, “Lady Ashton: Mistaking quiet diplomacy for silence”, The Guardian, 19 
July 2010.  
5 Constant Brand, “Ashton urged to speak up on human rights”, European Voice, 22 July 2010.  EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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be more effective”,6 but once again any substance to the policy was lacking. 
Therefore, if the HR/VP has not offered a clear explanation of her central doctrine for 
EU diplomacy, one must ask: what is quiet diplomacy?  
 
There is remarkably little written on quiet diplomacy as a diplomatic technique and 
the concept is most notable for its lack of a clear definition. Collins and Packer argue 
that  “the aim of quiet diplomacy is to create conditions in which parties feel 
comfortable to act, in particular allowing parties calmly to evaluate positions and 
interests, to weigh options and consider independent and impartial advice”.7 Or 
more simply, “preventive diplomacy executed through quiet means”.8 
 
A difficulty for the HR/VP is the limited scope of quiet diplomacy coupled with the 
extremely wide remit of EU external relations. By professing her believe in quiet 
diplomacy  so strongly at the beginning of her mandate,  the HR/VP gives the 
impression that it is the only tool in the EU’s diplomatic bag. However,  when 
presented with foreign policy concerns as wide ranging as humanitarian disasters in 
Haiti to relations with the EU’s strategic partners to war in Libya, quiet diplomacy will 
be shown to not be a ‘one size fits all’ strategy, leaving the HR/VP and the EU open 
to criticism.  
 
Despite these criticisms one should not forget the nascent nature of the EEAS and the 
role of the HR/VP.  Quiet diplomacy is a pragmatic disguise which simultaneously 
allows for the building of the EEAS to continue unhindered while acting as a shield, 
deflecting any negative criticism of inaction as simply the implementation of the 
quiet diplomacy strategy. In other words, it allows the HR/VP to put forward a vision 
for an EU diplomatic approach, but satisfies the desire of the Member States that the 
EEAS and HR/VP remain ‘quiet’. 
 
Given the current context, this diplomatic approach serves its purpose, allowing the 
building of the EEAS to continue, the HR/VP to make the best with what she has and 
for the Member States to pay heed to her policies and ideas, without the need to 
make any grand concessions. However, in the long term, there is no guarantee quiet 
diplomacy will deliver the sort of changes envisioned in the Lisbon Treaty, especially 
in terms of the EU’s international role.  On this point, it is worth considering what 
exactly the HR/VP is tasked with. Article 27(2) TEU provides a clear definition of duties: 
The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the 
common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third 
parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in international 
organisations and at international conferences.  
                                                 
6 Stephen Castel, “Nominee for E.U. Foreign Affairs Chief Is Cautious at Confirmation Hearing”, 
The New York Times, 11 January 2010. 
7  Craig Collins and John Packer, “Quiet Diplomacy Option and Technique for Quiet 
Diplomacy”, Folke Bernadotte Academy, Edita Stockholm, 2006, p. 10.  
8 Ibid.  Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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However, finding a position to express from the outset may be difficult for the HR/VP 
when there are clear differences between Member States or between the Council 
and the Commission on foreign policy issues. Obvious differences in the direction of 
foreign policy will limit the ambition of the EEAS and the room for manoeuvre of 
HR/VP Ashton, often resulting in statements based on the most basic position. 9 
Therefore, one must return to the dominance of nation states in making EU 
diplomacy. From the Member States’ perspective the arrival of the EEAS is not meant 
to signal the arrival of a fully-fledged ‘EU Foreign Ministry’, just a limited version which 
can enhance the role of the EU, but not replace the dominance of respective 
Foreign Ministries.  
 
Quiet diplomacy is the lowest common dominator of strategy available to the HR/VP 
given her other commitments and reliance on the assent of the Member States. In 
her first article the HR/VP outlined that “we need officials who can work behind the 
scenes as well as in the glare of the spotlight”,10 a description which is equally apt to 
designate the relationship between the EEAS and the Member States – to work in the 
spotlight when there is agreement and behind the scenes when there is none.   
 
Outline of the Paper 
 
This paper sets out to examine some of the most pertinent questions relating to the 
arrival of the EEAS and the making of EU diplomacy. In three sections  six essays 
address the impact of  the EEAS on EU Member States’  embassies and on the 
European Commission, the nature of the new EU diplomats in the EEAS and the 
potential development of an EU ‘esprit de corps’. 
 
The first section  asks  what the creation  of  the EEAS means  for  two  key outlets of 
European diplomacy. Clive Cusens examines the likely impact of the EEAS on the 
national embassies of the EU Member States both within the EU and for  their 
representations  in third countries. If the EEAS is presented as a single diplomatic 
corps, is the rationale for having 27 different national embassies still present?  The 
EEAS reshapes the institutional set-up of the EU and how it undertakes its external 
relations.  Florian Bergmüller thus  looks at the potential loss of external relations 
capacity for the European Commission.  
 
The second section investigates what the concept of an ‘EU diplomat’ introduced 
by the EEAS actually is. Raïssa Marteaux provides an analysis of how and by whom 
the EEAS is  staffed, examining whether the targets of gender and geographical 
balance can be fulfilled and what working culture the EEAS is likely to adopt given its 
                                                 
9 For more on the HR/VP’s role in ensuring consistency see Paul Quinn, “The Lisbon Treaty: 
Answering the Call for Greater Coherence in EU External Relations?”, in Dieter Mahncke and 
Sieglinde Gstöhl (eds.), Coherence, Unity and Effectiveness, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 
forthcoming.  
10 Catherine Ashton, op.cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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fusion of national diplomats and Commission and Council functionaries. Francesca 
Fenton addresses the fundamental question of what it means to be an EU diplomat 
in practice based on interviews with recently appointed Heads of Delegation.  
 
Finally, if the EEAS is to be a truly effective ‘foreign service’, a certain esprit de corps 
should be instilled to ensure that European interests are put forward. The third section 
provides relevant examples of a European esprit de corps  in action and how 
effective European diplomacy can be garnered from this basis. Thomas Heidener 
explores the factors that contribute to the effectiveness of COREPER and how 
national  (and EU) diplomats  can effectively work together. Charles Thépaut 
examines the potential for European diplomats abroad to create a ‘late’ diplomatic 
corps, the conditions for which are relevant to all EU Delegations.  
 
The EEAS represents a formidable challenge for the EU and marks the arrival of EU 
diplomacy on the world stage. Nevertheless, it is in the corridors of power and in EU 
Delegation meeting rooms where the real test for EU diplomats and the EU 
diplomacy they represent will be held.  
 10 
The EEAS vs. the National Embassies of EU Member States? 
Clive Cusens  
 
The intensified political integration of the European Union is now also focusing on 
strengthening  diplomatic integration in the form of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS). In an era in which the EU is operating in a framework of increasing 
interdependence and in which the need for a common position becomes more and 
more of a norm (taking as an example the fact that Council decisions are 
increasingly agreed to by consensus, even for decisions in which qualified majority 
voting systems are in place) 1, what is the rationale of still having 27 national 
embassies operating in one place both within the intra-EU realm as well as beyond 
the EU’s borders, instead of having a single EU diplomatic corps?  
 
This thought leads to the question to what extent diplomatic integration will lead to 
the demise of the national embassies of EU Member States. In order to answer this 
question, this essay looks at two levels of interaction: the intra-EU level, meaning the 
diplomatic relations between EU Member  States,  as well as the external level, 
meaning the relations between the EU Member States and third countries. By looking 
at the diplomatic relations on these two levels, my hypothesis is that the national 
embassies of EU states will not become a relic of the past as long as special political, 
commercial and/or other bilateral interests between two countries still exist, whether 
at the intra-EU level or at the external level. 
 
Therefore, I begin by looking at the necessity of still having several national embassies 
operating concurrently in the internal arena or whether these should be allowed to 
slowly disappear into the history books, and then look at the external arena and 
examine the feasibility of having both EU representations as well as EU national 
embassies. 
 
The Internal Dimension 
 
There are currently a plethora of institutions within the EU in which representatives of 
Member States can directly discuss topical issues ranging from the least technical of 
internal policy to the most ambitious of defence policy. The main institutions include 
the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of Ministers and 
COREPER. The European Commission was deliberately left out of this list since Article 
245 TFEU states that “Member States shall respect their [the Commissioners that are 
chosen from each Member State] independence and shall not seek to influence 
them in the performance of their tasks”. Surely, with all these institutions in place, the 
                                                 
1 Stephen  Sieberson, “Inching Toward EU Supranationalism? Qualified Majority Voting and 
Unanimity under the Treaty of Lisbon”, Virginia Journal of International Law, vol. 50, no. 4, 
2010, p. 938. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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role of the national Foreign Ministry ought to be in decline. And yet, the embassies 
remain. Why? 
 
To begin with, the national embassy’s traditional role of “representation, intelligence-
gathering and communication” has,  according to Hocking,  been challenged by 
“the twin forces of globalisation and regionalisation”.2 In addition, the traditional role 
of the national embassy has been diminished due to the several afore-mentioned EU 
fora. However, there are still other areas where the embassy can play a crucial role 
in another EU state. One of these areas is business, where the embassy can aid 
investment – whether for investment from country A into the host state (country B) or 
to secure deals for country A from investors in country B. The institutions at the EU 
level do not cater for such bilateral agreements between states and this is one 
argument in favour of keeping an embassy. As if to emphasise this point, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Malta in November 2010 issued a press release which referred to 
a renewed commitment to strengthening its bilateral relations with Germany, making 
reference to commercial investment and political and economic collaboration.3  
 
Another important role for the national embassy in the EU arena is of course public 
diplomacy. Sometimes, it may be beneficial to bypass the heads of government (or 
other representatives at the EU level) and appeal directly to the host country’s 
population or media in order to convince them that their government’s actions are 
good, or to at least ensure fair reporting of anything related to their government’s 
actions or words. This is why some embassies have their own Public Relations teams 
with resources such as printed materials, multi-language websites, information 
officers and so on; in order to clarify, justify or defend their government’s position.4 
Therefore, as long as an EU state has enough funds to sustain an embassy in another 
EU country, it will do so for some or all of the reasons highlighted above.  
 
But what about the external dimension? Would it not be appropriate to argue that 
since the EU’s external relations with other states in issue  areas such as trade, 
development aid, crisis management and others – in which Member States have 
increasingly less divergent views from a common EU position – the role of the national 
embassy should make way for the EEAS to communicate the EU’s position to third 
countries?  
 
                                                 
2 Brian Hocking, “Introduction: Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking about Foreign 
Ministries in the European Union”, in Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries 
in the European Union, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 1. 
3 “Malta Consolidates its Bilateral Relations with Germany”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Malta, 
03/11/10, retrieved 14 November 2010, http://www.foreign.gov.mt/default.aspx?MDIS= 
21&NWID=1256 
4 G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy Theory and Practice, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 
184-188. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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The External Dimension 
 
There are two additional main arguments that I would like to put forward in order to 
highlight the need for national embassies to remain operational in third countries 
outside the EU; namely, the fact that the EEAS does not have the competence to 
deal with all aspects of foreign policy (other than the ones mentioned above) and 
that special relationships exist between certain EU states and third countries, either 
due to historical ties and/or geographic location. 
 
From a financial perspective, EU states with budgetary constraints have a lot to gain 
from pooling their resources into a unified EU representation. Aggestam et al. state 
that in 2006, the (then) ten new EU members had no representation with 90 third 
countries.5 Thus, the benefit of cooperation is an obvious alternative to establishing 
national embassies. This argument is especially valid for countries who have a low 
interest in certain third countries but who would nonetheless wish to have legitimate 
representation. Some small states have, for example, downsized their foreign 
diplomatic presence in third countries since Article 20.2(c) TEU gives their citizens the 
right of “protection of the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State as 
the same nationals of that State”. However, there is more than the Foreign Affairs 
budget to consider and the authors later argue that: 
 
Many difficulties surrounding joint representation boil down to the fact  that 
commercial and political strength are still closely associated with  extensive 
diplomatic contacts and that competing interests between  Member States 
continue to exist, even in areas of regular cooperation.6 
 
With this in mind, it becomes evident that due to the limited scope of EEAS compe-
tences, as well as the arguments put forward by the above authors, the need for the 
national embassy remains vital. It is a way for EU countries to individually ensure that 
their national interests are being safeguarded, as long as they have the resources to 
sustain their foreign service. 
 
The above argument considered solely the needs of the separate EU states. Yet, 
what about arguing in favour of maintaining national embassies whilst highlighting 
the fact that this is also in the interest of the EU? The historic and/or geographic links 
between EU states and third countries seem to have been overlooked by ardent 
supporters of the EEAS. It is expected that decades, or perhaps even centuries, of 
diplomatic relations between geographic or cultural neighbours, or between former 
colonial powers and their colonies, will carry more weight than a fledgling EEAS with 
no such ties. What the supporters of the EEAS should always bear in mind is that the 
EEAS can make use of – but not assume – the close ties that some EU states have 
with third countries. As an example, Malta’s traditional close ties with Libya enabled it 
                                                 
5 Lisbeth Aggestam et al., “Institutional Competences in the EU External Action: Actors and 
Boundaries in CFSP and ESDP”, SIEPS, Stockholm, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 
vol. 6-7, May 2008, pp. 64-65. 
6 Ibid., p. 66. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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to be a major player in the negotiations aiming to resolve the visa dispute between 
Switzerland and Libya, with the media reporting that “[t]he Maltese and Italian 
governments were at the forefront to help end the diplomatic dispute”.7 Similarly, 
centuries of diplomatic relations between the UK and its  various ex-colonies 
undoubtedly gives it an edge over its fellow EU members, especially considering its 
ties with the Commonwealth, which are still relevant today. It could be that it is in the 
EU’s interest to use particular ties, especially between peripheral EU members and 
countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy, rather than to attempt to redefine 
a relationship under the EEAS. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By looking at both the diplomatic relations between states at an intra-EU level as well 
as at the external level, I have attempted to show why the national embassies of EU 
states are still relevant in today’s increasingly supranational EU. However, the 
examples illustrated throughout this paper should not be seen as a dismissal of the 
idea of having an EEAS. A more coherent foreign policy will undoubtedly bring great 
advantages to the EU in terms of prestige, international clout and bargaining.  
 
Thus, as Bátora  and Hocking  put it, that “[r]ather than a zero-sum relationship, 
Member States and the EU as a collective foreign policy actor may operate along-
side, across and in tandem with one another”.8 After all, Article 27 TEU emphasises 
that the EEAS will work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member 
States and not replace them. In view of the hypothesis that this essay has put forth, it 
is perhaps ironic to point out that national interests  can actually be used to 
complement something as supranational in nature as the EEAS. 
 
 
                                                 
7 “Libya  –  Switzerland dispute over”, Maltamediaonline.com, 13  June 2010, retrieved 17 
November 2010, http://www.maltamediaonline.com/?p=26248 
8 Jozef Bátora and Brian Hocking, “Bilateral Diplomacy in the European Union: Towards ‘post-
modern’ patterns?”, Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Clingendael Institute, The Hague, April 
2008, p. 6. 14 
The EEAS: A Loss for the European Commission’s External Relations Capacities? 
Florian Bergmüller  
 
With the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the 
transfer of departments and staff from the European Commission, the General 
Secretariat of the Council and the diplomatic bodies of the Member States on 1 
January 2011, the last major institutional innovation in foreign policy of the Treaty of 
Lisbon came into effect. The creation of the new diplomatic service was certainly an 
intricate undertaking, hampered by turf wars between the different institutions, with 
the European Parliament playing a prominent role. One point of contention 
concerned the status of the EEAS, which eventually followed the logic championed 
by the Member States, that is, the creation of a “functionally autonomous body”1 
separate from the Council and the Commission. This autonomy is corroborated by 
conferring the EEAS with the “legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain 
its objectives”,2 which transforms the diplomatic service into a quasi-institution. Claims 
of the European Parliament to integrate the EEAS into the Commission’s administra-
tive order3 were thus clearly dismissed. 
 
This contribution analyses this transfer of resources and functions to the EEAS and 
assesses  possible losses of the Commission in its external relations capacities. The 
Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
new service constitutes the primary data used for this analysis. The three areas of 
interest which will subsequently be examined are: transfer  of staff, transfer of 
instruments and functions, and authority of the Heads of Delegations. The  essay 
concludes with a summary of the arguments and places the issue into a broader 
picture. 
 
Transfer of Staff 
 
As stipulated in Article 6.9 of the Council Decision, “permanent officials of the Union 
should represent at least 60% of all EEAS staff” while the remaining officials should 
come from the Member States’ Ministries. The Commission is expected to contribute 
one third of the Service’s overall staff, at the beginning an even higher share.4 All the 
officials of the Directorate-General for External Relations (DG Relex) were moved to 
                                                 
1 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2010/427/EC) of 26 July 2010 establishing 
the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 201/30, 3 August 2010, Art. 1.2. Hereinafter “Council Decision”. 
2 Ibid. 
3  European  Parliament, “European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2009 on the 
institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service (2009/2133(INI))”, Art. 
7, retrieved 12 November 2010, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2009-0057+0+DOC+XML + V0//EN&language=EN.  
4 “EEAS decision –  main elements”, Europa Press Releases, MEMO/10/311, 8 July 2010, 
retrieved 11 November 2010, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
MEMO/10/311.  EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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the EEAS. The same accounts for the Commission’s external service, with some 
exceptions.5 Moreover, a substantial part of the Directorate-General for Develop-
ment (DG Dev) was  transferred,  that is, all the country desks of the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States as well as staff responsible for 
programming and Pan-African relations.6 
 
The staff outflow does not only mean the termination of DG Relex, and consequently 
a loss of expertise and personnel resources in the field of the Union’s external 
relations, but also a reshuffle in the Commission’s development cooperation policy 
structures.  The remainder of DG Dev has been merged  with the EuropeAid Co-
operation Office which until now has been responsible for the implementation of the 
programmes developed in the former. This brings about a streamlining of the 
remaining structures in a new Directorate-General (DG DevCo).7 
 
Hence, the Commission loses its personnel resources in external relations and suffers a 
weakening of its development cooperation section. However, the fact that those 
transferred officials are eligible to assume all kind of positions in the EEAS8 could 
reverberate positively into the Commission. Indeed, the staff originating in the 
Commission could take over positions in the field of the Union’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), for example  the chairmanship of preparatory working 
groups in the Council or the participation in bodies of the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the EEAS is a quasi-institution separate from the 
Commission and the transferred staff become EEAS staff, it is probable that the 
linkage to their former employer will not be cut completely and the working culture, 
perspective and experience gained in the Commission will accompany them in their 
new EEAS posts. Furthermore, they are able to go back to the Commission as they 
“shall have the right to apply for posts in their institution of origin on the same terms as 
internal applicants”.9 Thus, from the EEAS to the Commission mobility is equal to 
internal Commission mobility.10 Coupled with the possibility to be seconded into the 
CFSP field, one can argue that those officials transferred from the Commission and 
susceptible to return in the future indirectly decrease the latter’s distance to CFSP. 
 
                                                 
5 In both cases, staff responsible for the management and implementation of financial 
instruments remains with the Commission. Concerning the Commission’s external service, 
sections of Commission policies such as trade will in the new Union Delegations still be dealt 
with by Commission officials, Council of the European Union, op.cit., Annex 2 and Art. 5.2(3). 
6 Council of the European Union, op.cit., Annex 2. 
7 Simon Taylor and Toby Vogel, “EEAS appointments trigger mini-reshuffle”, European Voice, 
2010, retrieved 5 November 2010, http://www.europeanvoice.com/CWS/Index.aspx? 
PageID=213&articleID=69253.  
8 Council of the European Union, op.cit., Art. 6.7. 
9 Ibid., Art. 6.11(2). 
10Adriaan  Schout and Sarah  Wolff, “Ever Closer Union? Supranationalism and Intergovern-
mentalism  as Concept”, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, 
Conference Paper for the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, 23-26 June 2010, 
Porto, retrieved 10 November 2010, http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-porto/virtualpaperroom/ 
086.pdf, p. 16. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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Transfer of Instruments and Functions 
 
It is within the main tasks of the EEAS to “assist the [...] Commission in the exercise of 
[...its] respective functions in the area of external relations”.11 Besides the obligation 
to cooperate and to consult each other in order to ensure coherence, it is stipulated 
that the EEAS “shall take part in the preparatory work and procedures relating to 
acts to be prepared by the Commission in this area”.12 
 
There are several external assistance instruments whose handling is partially trans-
ferred to the EEAS. These are the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the 
European Development Fund  (EDF), the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR),  the  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI), the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, the Instrument for 
Nuclear Safety Cooperation (NSCI), and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). Although the 
respective decisions concerning these instruments still will be taken by the College of 
Commissioners, “the EEAS shall contribute to [their...] programming and manage-
ment cycle”.13 This means that the EEAS has the competence to prepare proposals 
for decisions within the scope of these  instruments, “following the Commission’s 
procedures”. 14 The responsibility for preparing decisions within the instruments is 
especially clear concerning country allocations, country and regional strategy 
papers, and national and regional indicative programmes.15 All decisions with regard 
to the DCI, the EDF and the ENPI shall be prepared jointly by the Commission and the 
EEAS.16 
 
In practice, this could mean that the EEAS, having the capacity to make proposals, 
shares the right of initiative with the Commission in the mentioned areas. The latter 
consequently loses its autonomy in the phase of planning and programming acts 
related to these instruments. Practice and service-level agreements will decide how 
this necessarily close cooperation eventually works out.17 
 
Overall Authority of Heads of Delegations 
 
The  staff of the Delegations of the Commission, together with the staff from the 
Council Liaison Offices, have been transferred to the EEAS to form the Union Delega-
tions. Nonetheless, the EU Delegations also comprise officials who continue to belong 
to the Commission, viz. those responsible “for the implementation of the Union 
budget and Union policies other than those under the remit of the EEAS”.18 Trade 
                                                 
11 Council of the European Union, op.cit., Art. 2.2. 
12 Ibid., Art. 3.2. 
13 Ibid., Art. 9.3. 
14 Ibid., Art. 9.3(5). 
15 Ibid., Art. 9.3(i), (ii) and (iii). 
16 Ibid., Art. 9.4 and 9.5. 
17 Ibid., Art. 3.3. 
18 Ibid., Art. 5.2(3). EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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policy and the parts of the development cooperation policy which are not trans-
ferred to the EEAS are the main sections which fall into that category. However, 
although Commission staff will not form an integral part of the EEAS, the Heads of 
Delegations “shall have authority over all staff in the delegation, whatever their 
status, and for all its activities”.19 This provision without any doubt also includes the 
Commission staff and provides the Heads of Delegations with a ‘double hatting’ 
similar to that of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-
President (HR/VP) of the Commission with responsibilities not only in CFSP but also in 
external policies of the Commission. Given that several Heads of Delegations are 
seconded officials from the national diplomatic services, diplomats with a  purely 
national/intergovernmental background will have, on the ground, authority over 
Commission policies. 
 
It has to be noted that all decisions which have to be approved by the College of 
Commissioners still follow the same procedure, and the Commission at any time may 
issue instructions to the Delegations in that section, which makes an erosion of 
Commission competences unlikely. However, the EEAS as a quasi-institution separate 
from the Commission is to a certain extent able to intrude on the areas of 
Commission policies on the ground. Furthermore, as the Heads of Delegations do not 
only receive instructions from the HR/VP but from the EEAS as a whole – and there is 
no exclusion  formulated for Commission policies –  these also will influence the 
Commission’s field of competence in respect to third countries.20 Hence, from the 
Commission’s perspective, these changes in the Delegations brought about by the 
EEAS do mean a loss in autonomy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
When Lady Ashton at the end of October 2010 decided in favour of the Triangle 
building on the Rond Point Schuman – and against the Commission’s Charlemagne 
and the European Council’s Lex building – as the new EEAS’ headquarters, not only 
practical and financial reasons might have played a role. The acquisition of a new 
building from an unrelated third source, with equal distance to the Commission’s 
central administration Berlaymont and the Council’s Justus Lipsius, can also be seen 
as a symbolic underpinning of the Union’s purpose to create a functionally auto-
nomous body separate from other institutions, though fed by them.  
 
This essay has shown that at the staffing level, the Commission has lost personnel 
resources and expertise. However, the eligibility for the transferred officials for purely 
CFSP-related tasks coupled with the still existing virtual linkage to their former 
employer by internal Commission mobility could bring the Commission closer to the 
intergovernmental field of foreign policy. At the level of instruments and functions, 
                                                 
19 Ibid., Art. 5.2(2). 
20 Ibid., Art. 5.3. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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the Commission in some areas lost autonomy and has to share its right of proposal. A 
similar conclusion has been drawn for the effects of the  reshuffle  of  external 
Delegations which provides the new Heads of Delegations with a ‘double hatting’ 
and reduces the Commission’s dominance on the ground in fields of exclusive 
external competence. 
 
The loss of certain resources and autonomy in some external policy fields to the EEAS 
is  therefore palpable. However, the calculus of the Council could show similar 
cessions and the achievement of the overall aim of the Treaty of Lisbon of 
consistency in the Union’s external action is only possible if the hitherto separated 
parts of EU foreign policy get closer and more integrated. How far reaching the 
consequences of the endowment of the EEAS will finally be will not least be decided 
by the establishment of working practices. 
 19 
Staffing the EEAS: More Diversity 
Raïssa Marteaux 
 
“A diplomatic service that is well resourced and above all well staffed can give a 
state a significant increment of power and influence.”1 The European Union is no 
exception, which is why, with the formal launch of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS) on the 1 January 2011, the EU has finally established its own foreign 
diplomatic service. In order to make EU diplomacy work, a unified diplomatic culture 
must be created within the EEAS. Normally, Foreign Ministries create their own 
distinctive diplomatic culture, in part from their patterns of recruitment. 2 Conse-
quently, careful selection is a key element to the success of the EEAS.  
 
While a selection procedure for EEAS staff has been developed, the first appoint-
ments to high-level positions have raised critique within the Member States. In this 
essay I analyse the EEAS high-level staff recruitment in order to provide an indication 
of the diplomatic culture that is being created. In the first section, I examine 
background factors such as staff gender and nationality, factors that are highly 
influential in the creation of the EEAS diplomatic culture. In the second section, I 
assess background factors in the staff’s organizational culture, such as institutional 
and inter-institutional elements. 
 
Gender Equality and Geographic Balance 
 
Article 6(7) of the Council Decision 2010/427/EU states that recruitment should ensure 
“adequate geographical balance, a need for a meaningful presence of nationals 
from all EU Member States on the EEAS and aiming towards gender balance”.3 Since 
statistics on gender and geographical allocation are not yet published for the whole 
of the EEAS staff, I focus on the high-level appointments that have been made by 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine 
Ashton. 
 
The Council Decision states that the EEAS should aim towards gender balance, yet 
intermittent targets are unknown. This makes it more difficult to judge whether the 
objective has actually been achieved. According to the European Parliament 
Committee on Women's Rights  and Gender Equality, gender balance should be 
ensured with a 50/50 distribution between women and men, even at the highest 
                                                 
1  G.R. Berridge, Maurice  Keens-Soper and Thomas  G. Otte, Diplomatic Theory from 
Machiavelli to Kissinger, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 198. 
2 Ibid., p. 10. 
3 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service, Brussels, 20 July 2010 (OR.en), 11665/1/10 REV 1, POLGEN 104, INST 243. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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level.4 However, none of the Member State Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) possess 
a 50% female Ambassador ratio. At 33.71%, Finland has the highest percentage of 
female Ambassadors. In light of these statistics it would be unreasonable to conclude 
that the EEAS has come far short of achieving its gender balance objective.5 I will 
therefore examine the percentage of newly appointed female Heads of Delegation 
and assess whether this percentage has improved the overall gender ratio.   
 
From the new appointments, the following is evident. Of the 470 candidates who 
applied for vacant positions, 64 were short-listed for an interview with Catherine 
Ashton, of which 14 were women (21%).6 When Ashton appointed the first Heads of 
Delegation and Deputy Heads of Delegation, seven out of 29 (24%) were women. 
Three posts were re-advertised because no suitable candidate could be found, of 
which two positions were given to women. This brings the total percentage of female 
Ambassadors made in the first appointments to 28%. Unfortunately, the same cannot 
be said of the EEAS Senior Management in Headquarters. Here, only three women 
form a part of the first selected 20-head strong team, a fact that has led to heavy 
criticism.7 
 
When these  appointments of Heads of Delegation are compared with previous 
years, it becomes apparent that Lady  Ashton did indeed aim towards achieving 
gender balance, since the female staff ratio has considerably improved. Including 
the 12 women that were posted before the new appointments, the number of 
women has increased to 21 in total. This results in a 50% increase of female Heads of 
Delegation, compared with pre-Lisbon Treaty levels.8 
 
Regarding ‘geographical balance’, the definition of the term itself remains unclear. 
That is to say, whether this refers to geographical allocations according to 
population, size or diplomatic weight is uncertain. Moreover, although it has been 
decided that national quotas would not be included in the Council Decision, HR/VP 
Ashton must nevertheless "respect the size of the countries", a requirement that is 
even more obscure.9 The struggle to achieve geographical balance is reflected in 
the first appointments. Under the previous allocation, the 117 Heads of Delegation 
were selected from a mere 14 Member States, whereas the 120 Heads of Delegation 
                                                 
4 European Parliament, Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, Franziska 
Katharina Brantner, Opinion on the proposal for a Council decision establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 08029/2010–C7-
0090/2010–2010/0816(NLE), Brussels, 24 July 2010, amendments 6, 7 and 8. 
5 Ryszarda Formuszewicz and Jakub Kumoch, “The Practice of Appointing the Heads of EU 
Delegations in the Wake of the Council Decision on European External Action Service”, PISM 
Report, Warsaw, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, August 2010, p. 26. 
6 Europa, "2010 Rotation-Head of Delegation/Deputy Head of Delegation appointments”, 
MEMO/10/415, Brussels, 15 September 2010. 
7 Toby Vogel, “The battle for influence in the EU's diplomatic service”, European Voice, 20 
January 2011. 
8 Europa, op.cit. 
9 “Top officials start building EU diplomatic ’house’”, Euractiv, 26 October 2010. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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have now been selected from 20 Member States. The ratios have also changed 
slightly. Whereas France previously had the largest number of appointees (16), it now 
remains with 11 appointed Ambassadors. Spain, on the other hand, has increased its 
number of Ambassadors by three, while the UK has lost two. Belgium occupies first 
place, having 16 selected Ambassadors. Finland has decreased representation from 
three Ambassadors to one. 
 
In the new appointments, diplomats from 15 Member States were selected, although 
32 positions were available. This leaves Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and Slovenia without 
Ambassadors. The most prominent positions (Heads of Delegation to China, Japan 
and South Africa) were awarded to Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, which 
received two, one and two positions, respectively.10 The big ‘winners’ were Spain, 
with five positions, and France, Ireland and Portugal with three positions each. Italy 
and Poland seem to be the losers, each having received only two positions. 11 
Moreover, whereas previously only one Head of Delegation was selected from the 
newly acceded Member States, the new appointments added four Heads of 
Delegation from the Member States that have joined since 2004 (a total of 12,5%).  
 
On the basis of these figures, it can be concluded that the geographical allocation is 
now more diverse. Nevertheless, the allocation of Member States remains very 
unequal. Although selection should be based purely on merit, HR/VP  Ashton will 
need to be very careful with her future appointments if geographical balance is to 
be adequately achieved. The Director of the European Policy Department in the 
Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs already claimed  that its diplomats were under-
represented in the EU diplomatic system.12 Poland voiced particular complaints over 
the appointment of a supposedly less qualified Lithuanian diplomat for the position in 
Afghanistan.13 In addition, Slovenia expressed dissatisfaction with the appoint-ments 
since no Slovenian Ambassador was selected.  
 
The geographical balance among the EEAS Senior Management staff is not much 
better. The first 20 positions were divided across 11 Member States. Of these 20 
positions, only three have been given to Member States that joined the EU since 
2004. Again, three positions have gone to France and three to Sweden, as opposed 
to the 16 Member States which had no high-level positions at Headquarters.14 High 
Representative Ashton has attempted to calm the discontent by stating that this was 
only the “first round” of appointments, while one would “see Europe unfold” in the 
following rounds.15 It is nonetheless apparent that, although there has been some 
improvement in more diverse geographical representation, it remains insufficient. 
                                                 
 
11 Ibid.  
12 “Poland loses Georgia in EU diplomatic race”, Euractiv, 27 August 2011.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15  Honor Mahony, “Ashton announces first tranche of appointees to new service”, EU 
Observer, 15 September 2010. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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With 27 out of 31 senior positions filled, the UK holds a strong majority. Six posts have 
been filled by the UK, France remains with three posts while Germany and Poland 
are seen as the big ‘losers’.16 Sweden, Italy and the Netherlands, on the other hand, 
received two positions  each, while new Member States, such as Romania and 
Slovakia, did not receive any delegation posts but a senior position at Headquarters.  
 
The EEAS is thus in a difficult situation concerning future appointments. One way to 
correct these imbalances would be to nominate particular types of diplomats. For 
example, to balance gender representation, more female diplomats with experi-
ence in the foreign services could be nominated.17 Yet two problems arise: first, 
adequate candidates must first apply for the position. As has already been 
mentioned, only 14 women were short-listed. Of these, nine were selected. This is not 
at all a bad rate. However, if not enough women apply for the positions, it remains 
impossible to select them. A second challenge is that applicants must comply with 
the stringent criteria set by the EEAS. As has been made apparent by interviews with 
EEAS officials, women often score better on their personal competencies because, 
during personal interviews, they are generally rated as more pleasant and charming 
than men. For women, the main problem remains relevant work experience.18 
 
With respect to geographical allocation, it is doubtful whether this criterion can ever 
be adequately met. Many have, for example, criticised the fact that Belgium has so 
many posts. However, Belgian diplomats are generally better prepared than the 
average European diplomat because the Belgium training system is so ’European-
ised’.19 In fact, Member States often want as many of their own representatives in the 
positions as possible in order to be able to communicate to their domestic consti-
tuencies that they have managed to get their Ambassadors selected.20 Following 
the appointments, they often care little about their Ambassadors until the next round 
of vacancies. 21 In order to alleviate critique, however, certain objective criteria 
could be constructed and applied only when the candidates have already passed 
the first round of interviews. It must be deemed positive that the High Representative 
is assisted by a “professionally-qualified consultative body” when selecting the 
diplomats.22 If Member States find that their candidates are not being selected, they 
may be motivated to determine the inherent reasons and improve training, with the 
                                                 
16 Toby Vogel, op.cit. 
17 European Commission, Taking Europe to the World: 50 Years of the European Commission’s 
External Service, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 
2004, p. 50. 
18 Interview with Jochen Pöttgen, Deputy Head of Division EEAS/ C2 Staff in Delegations, 
Brussels, 14 April 2011. 
19 Interview with an official, Security Policy Unit European External Action Service, Bruges, 31 
March 2011. 
20 Interview with a former Head of Delegation, European Commission, Bruges, 23 April 2011.  
21 Ibid. 
22 David Hannay, “Benchmarking the EUs new diplomatic service”, Europe's World, autumn 
2010. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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objective  of ensuring that their staff be  better qualified and more likely to be 
selected for EEAS positions. 
 
Balancing Institutional and Administrative Cultures 
 
What organisational  culture prevails will be particularly relevant for  the ability to 
create a coherent diplomatic culture. EEAS staff originates from three key sources: 
the General Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and the Member States. Until 
now, institutional officials have been in competition with one another, rather than 
acting as a coordinated body.23 It remains to be seen whether placing the diplomats 
in one institution will create a better coordinated and thus more coherent external 
action or whether this will simply institutionalise the existing inter-institutional conflicts. 
Depending on the staff ratios and their ability to cooperate with one another, 
momentum could be created either for the establishment of a unified diplomatic 
culture or for one that remains divided. 
 
In fulfilling appointments, the High Representative is to treat staff equally, including 
the “eligibility to assume all positions under equivalent conditions”.24 When the EEAS 
has reached its full capacity, Member States should provide about one third of the 
EEAS staff, including diplomatic staff for Delegations, while remaining staff should be 
transferred from other EU institutions. 25 In considering appointments at Head of 
Delegation level, it is evident that this ratio of one third is slightly unbalanced, yet in 
favour of the Member States. Of the 29 positions that were filled during the first 
appointment round, 10 went to diplomats from Member States whereas 16 posts 
were filled by diplomats from the Commission and three by diplomats from the 
Council.26 This implies that about one third of the staff is being provided by Member 
States, as should be the case. But what is most striking is that three of the most 
important appointments (China, Japan and South Africa) were given to Member 
State diplomats rather than Commission officials.27 
 
In addition to the staff ratio between the institutions, inter-institutional divisions will 
also have an important influence on assuring coherence. Of the 1,643 staff members 
at Administrator (AD) level that have been transferred in January 2011, the majority 
are from the Commission. They will bring with them the Commission's administrative 
culture; a culture in which they have worked and to which they have become 
                                                 
23 Maxime Lefebvre and Christophe Hillion, “The European External Action Service: Towards a 
common diplomacy?”, SIEPS, Stockholm, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, June 
2010, pp. 2-3. 
24 Council of the European Union, Presidency report to the European Council on the 
European External Action Service, doc. 14930/09, Brussels, 23 October 2009, p. 6. 
25  Council of the European Union, “Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU)”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 201, 26 July 2010, Article 6(7). 
26 “Ashton names EU ambassadors”, European Voice, 15 September 2010.  
27 Ibid. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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accustomed to.28 The majority of Commission staff transferred originates  from DG 
Relex  (Directorate-General External Relations), with 585 individuals at AD level. 93 
individuals have been transferred from DG Development (now DevCo) and 436 from 
the Delegations of DG Relex. 29 Conversely, only 411 staff are sourced from the 
Council.30 Although the Member States are the most likely candidates, this has yet to 
be confirmed. Because these staff members come from very different administrative 
backgrounds, there is cause to worry about their diverse working cultures. Due 
predominantly to its Francophone origins, DG Development has been described as 
being far more political than the other DGs.31 Conversely, DG Relex is described as 
more hierarchical and bureaucratic due to its Anglophone origins.32 
 
Since most staff comes from the Commission, it is most likely that the Commission 
culture will prevail, at least until the Member States will have filled their requisite one 
third of the positions. Nevertheless, the possibility that the influx of diplomatic cultures 
from ‘outside’  could modify the Commission culture cannot be discarded.33 The 
shaping of a diplomatic culture will not, however, be confined to Commission versus 
Council or the Member States. The equation becomes far more complex since, even 
within the Commission staff, different administrative cultures –  the so-called 'sub-
cultures' – are present. Since power often lies in numbers, it may be assumed that the 
administrative ‘sub-culture’ of DG Relex is likely to prevail. This implies four potential 
outcomes. Either all staff will need to adapt to the one prevailing culture (in this case, 
Commission bureaucracy and DG Relex's “highly structured, hierarchical and 
technical” method of working),34 or clashes could result between diverse administra-
tive cultures as staff emerging from different institutions maintain their own way of 
working. Internalising various cultures into one service may reasonably be expected 
to lead to incoherence, at least in the short term. A third alternative would be to 
place staff in positions in which they specialise, mandating that they work alongside 
each other, but not necessarily together. This is the so called ‘three-way split’, where 
Commission officials would take care of technical aspects while staff originating from 
the Council could formulate policy and diplomats from the Member States could set 
the agenda.35 
 
In the case of the EEAS, none of the above mentioned scenarios provide a realistic 
way forward. Although the majority of EEAS staff is sourced from DG Relex, this may 
change by 2013, when one third should originate from the Member States. Again, 
                                                 
28 David O’Sullivan, “The European External Action Service”, Speech at the Dublin Institute of 
International and European Affairs, podcast, 14 January 2011. 
29 Europa Rapid Press Release, A new step in the setting-up of the EEAS: Transfer of staff on 1 
January 2011, IP/10/1769, Brussels, 21 December 2010. 
30 Ibid., p. 29. 
31 Ibid., p. 16. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Interview with an official, Council General Secretariat, via phone, 1 May 2011. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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Member State diplomats would each bring with them their own organisational 
culture. Pragmatically, this could mean, for example, that the presence of many 
Spanish or German diplomats would lead to a different culture than if all the Member 
States were equally represented. The EEAS must therefore reduce, and preferably 
eliminate, conflict between the different institutions, so as to prevent the creation of 
‘silos’ that lead to conflicting objectives.36 In order to form a unique EEAS diplomatic 
culture, the only realistic option for the EEAS would be to ensure that diverse 
diplomatic cultures really mingle, rather than form opposing sub-cultures. The way to 
success requires a good working atmosphere with the establishment of cooperation 
and trust among staff members that would, in turn, enable effective communication. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although many positive changes have been implemented, these will most likely not 
be sufficient to make EU diplomacy work. The new appointments of female Heads of 
Delegation have improved the overall gender ratio, yet the current number  of 
female Heads of Delegation is far from the desired 50/50 gender distribution. 
Unfortunately, the situation in the Senior Management in Headquarters is even less 
positive, consequently much remains to be done. 
 
With respect to geographical allocation, it is doubtful whether this criterion can ever 
be adequately met. It may be concluded that geographical ratios are more diverse 
following the initial appointments. Nevertheless, the allocation of Member States 
remains very unequal. Rather than equalising the ratios among Member States, the 
new appointments have resulted in the opposite scenario. Some Member States now 
have up to 16 Ambassadors while  others have only one or none. In order to 
decrease tensions and ensure that no national diplomatic culture will prevail, a more 
equal distribution will be imperative. The situation of staff allocation at Headquarters 
is even worse. Although it is clear that there has been some improvement in 
geographical representation, it remains insufficient. 
 
Finally, depending on the staff ratios and their ability to cooperate with one another, 
momentum could be created for the establishment of a unified diplomatic culture. 
The key will thus be to avoid the institutionalisation of existing inter-institutional 
conflicts. Since power often lies in numbers, it may be assumed that the institutional 
culture of the Commission and the administrative ‘sub-culture’ of DG Relex are likely 
to prevail. Yet it is up to High Representative Ashton to reduce, and preferably to 
eliminate, conflict between the different institutions, so as to prevent the creation of 
‘silo’ that lead to conflicting objectives. This would be a big step towards making EU 
diplomacy work. 
 
                                                 
36 Interview with Stella Zervoudaki, Advisor Training, External Action Service Training Division, 27 
April 2011. 26 
EU Ambassadors: A New Creed?  
Francesca Fenton 
 
“Please note that there is no ‘EU Ambassador’  yet! I will be 
‘Head of the Delegation of the European Union, Ambassador’, 
but not Ambassador of the European Union.”1  
Newly appointed EU Head of Delegation  
 
The external service of the European Commission has flourished since the 1990s and 
with approximately 130 EU Delegations, is currently a worldwide diplomatic network.2 
Moreover, with the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS) set 
to create “an integrated European platform […] respected across the world”,3 the 
advent of an “embryonic new European diplomacy” is surely upon us.4 However, 
conceptualising this embryo is extremely complex, especially if one shares the 
traditional view of diplomacy as being strictly state business.5 Indeed, if diplomacy is 
concerned primarily with states, surely the idea of a European diplomat representing 
a sui generis geopolitical object is somehow fallacious. It is the aim of this essay to 
deny such fallacy by answering the following simple but under-theorised question: 
do truly European diplomats really exist and if so, what are they?  
 
In answer to this bipartite question, the essay takes as case studies the 27 Heads of 
Delegation that High Representative Catherine Ashton appointed on 15 September 
2010. Drawing on David Spence’s thesis that there exists an epistemic community of 
EU diplomats, it will first elucidate that these Ambassadors belong to such a 
community and are thus European Ambassadors. The following section will focus on 
the second part of the question by painting a portrait of the newly appointed Heads 
of Delegation. This will be done through an examination of the criteria Lady Ashton 
used to select them, as well as by analysing responses to questions that the current 
author put to them.  
 
The Existence of European Ambassadors 
 
In 2004 Paul Sharp penned a strong lamentation of the condition of today’s 
diplomats. Arguing that they have momentarily lost sight of their true purpose, Sharp 
proffered that “diplomats should remind themselves and others that they are first and 
foremost the representatives of sovereign states, that this is their raison d’être, and a 
                                                 
1 Interview with a newly appointed Head of Delegation, 15 November 2010. 
2 Michael  Bruter, “Diplomacy without a State: The External Delegations of the European 
Commission”, in Richard Langhorne and Christer Jönsson (eds.), Diplomacy, London, Sage, 
2004, vol. 3, p. 289.  
3 Stella Zervoudaki, Political Advisor at the European Commission, “EEAS, The Road to a More 
Coherent Foreign Policy”, lecture, College of Europe, Bruges, 4 November 2010.  
4 David  Spence,  “Taking Stock: 50 Years of  European Diplomacy”, The Hague Journal of 
Diplomacy, vol. 4, 2009, p. 236.  
5 Alan Henrikson, “Diplomacy”, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern World, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, vol. 2, p. 526.  EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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precondition for anything else they might aspire to be or to do”.6 Such a thesis is 
surprisingly not incompatible with the European Union. Indeed, although Rebecca 
Adler-Nissen posits that the EU’s Member  States currently practice a kind of “late 
sovereign  diplomacy”, where socialisation into the Brussels system merges the 
promotion of national and EU interests,7 her analysis focuses on national diplomats 
performing “intra-EU diplomacy” who are arguably still first and foremost represen-
tatives of the EU’s sovereign states.8 Although useful for analysing the behaviour of 
national diplomats, these authors fail to take into account a breed of supranational 
European diplomats that has existed for some time. Admittedly Adler-Nissen does 
mention the EU’s “full-blown external representation”, but she does not adequately 
explain it in her model.9 
 
Perhaps a more comprehensive explanation of the EU’s diplomatic corps is therefore 
David Spence’s thesis that there exist two epistemic communities of diplomats in the 
European Union. The first are national representatives, or “national careers” and the 
second, as “Euro-careers”, include “officials of an EU member state MFA or of the 
‘famille RELEX’ in the Commission  […  including]  the Commission delegations”. 10 
Spence’s view that officials of EU Member  State  Ministries of Foreign Affairs, who 
specialise in EU affairs, are “Euro-careers” or national officials “gone native”, is not 
strictly in keeping with Adler-Nissen’s late sovereign diplomats. 11 Although this is 
interesting, in this essay we are to focus on Euro diplomats that are fully emancipated 
from state-centrism, by analysing the Heads of Delegation of the European Union.   
 
With their own ‘Weltanschauung’ the Heads of Delegation “function in a psycho-
logical environment of almost total change from the precepts of ‘traditional’ 
national diplomats” and hence “have become authoritative figures  […]  whose 
expertise and readiness to take decisions collectively make them more than just any 
random group of experts”.12 More specifically, the new model accreditation letters 
that  are  sent  out to their countries of residence to be, asks the Heads of these 
countries to recognise  the EU Heads with “the rank and courtesy title of 
Ambassador”.13 Moreover, Article 3 of the EU’s new model establishment agree-
ments accords these Heads of Delegation with the “rights, privileges and immunities 
[…] laid down in the (1961) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations”.14 Provided 
their host country recognises them as such, they become EU Ambassadors.  
 
                                                 
6 Paul Sharp, “Who Needs Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic Representation”, in Richard 
Langhorne and Christer Jönsson (eds.), Diplomacy, London, Sage, 2004, vol. 3, p. 76. 
7 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Late Sovereign Diplomacy”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 
4, 2009, p. 121. 
8 Ibid., p. 136. 
9 Ibid., p. 127. 
10 David Spence, op.cit., p. 247.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 250.  
13 Model EU Establishment Agreement. 
14 Model EU Accreditation Letter. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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Considering the above and as these Ambassadors will have the “power to represent 
the Union in the country to which the delegation is accredited”, the distinction made 
by  the Head of Delegation in the introductory quote is arguably more politically 
correct than notionally accurate. 15 This essay, defying Paul Sharp’s state-centric 
view, instead proposes that the Heads of Delegation can be conceptualised as 
being truly European Ambassadors who belong to an epistemic community of 
European diplomats. It  is now interesting to discover what exactly it is that these 
Ambassadors represent.  
 
The Nature of the European Ambassador 
 
In an article published in December 2009, HR/VP Catherine Ashton argued that the 
EU is in the midst of establishing “a foreign service for the 21st century”, which will 
achieve its goals through “quiet diplomacy” practiced by EU officials who can “listen 
as well as talk and who can work behind the scenes as well as in the glare of the 
spotlight”.16 The eligibility criteria outlined in the job description for the Head of 
Delegation to Afghanistan suggests that these EU Ambassadors should possess the 
following characteristics: they are to have  “an excellent ability to maintain 
diplomatic relations at a senior level and to ensure representation, communication 
and management in a complex, multicultural environment”; they are supposed to 
“play a lead role in negotiations  […]  with national authorities  […]  international 
organisation(s)  […]  and Member States”; should “have excellent knowledge of 
external relations, internal policies and functioning of the Union”, and ought to “have 
proven experience in leading and motivating multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural 
teams”.17 If one were to crudely summarise both the main gist of these requirements 
and Ashton’s words, it is arguable that EU Ambassadors, representing the EU, ought 
to be good mediators in the convoluted international system. Furthermore, there is 
every suggestion in the above descriptions that state boundaries are to be trans-
cended, and that EU Ambassadors should strive to peacefully and unassumingly 
resolve problems arising in the international community.  
 
It is interesting to compare this description with what the newly appointed EU Heads 
of Delegation themselves think of their new roles. I posed four questions to each of 
them, in order to garner their views. The questions asked for: a description of the 
fundamental attributes of a European Union Ambassador; the differences between 
an EU Ambassador and a national one; what the evolution of the EU Ambassador’s 
role might be and whether or not there will be a socialisation of EU Ambassadors. 
Inevitably some of the Heads did not reply and others said they preferred not to 
                                                 
15 Council Decision  establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service, Brussels, 20 July 2010 (OR.en), 11665/1/10 REV 1, POLGEN 104, INST 243. 
16 Catherine Ashton, “Quiet diplomacy will get our voice heard”, The Times, 17 December 
2009. 
17 Stella Zervoudaki, Political Advisor at the European Commission, lecture, Bruges, College of 
Europe, 4 November 2010. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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comment, as they did not want to speculate before taking up the position. Nonethe-
less, two responses were most illustrative and are the subject of the remaining 
analysis.  
 
In answer to the question regarding the characteristics of EU Ambassadors, one 
respondent advanced the idea that “calm, good temper, patience and modesty” 
were “most important for a Head of EU Delegation”.  This is because “ensuring 
conflicts […] are dealt with in a calm way and avoiding any escalation seems […] to 
be essential, both in consensus seeking within the EU […] and in discussions with third 
countries”.18 Reflecting this, another stated that “skills in consensus building” as well 
as “flexibility and the capacity of adapting” are fundamental attributes of EU Heads 
of Delegation. Moreover, this respondent then went on to put forward the idea of an 
“EU team sur place”, made up of Delegation officials as well as national diplomats of 
the EU’s Member States.19 These responses are fascinating as there is clearly an 
emphasis placed by both on the need for Heads of Delegation to mediate 
differences, not only in the international sphere but between EU Member States, too. 
This very much reflects the aforementioned requirements outlined by the Head of 
Delegation job description and Lady Ashton.  
 
Another interesting remark made by the second respondent was that there “is a 
mandate unique and clear in the Lisbon Treaty for the EU Head of Delegation to 
represent, sell and present Europe”.  This can apparently be done through 
introducing the notion of “EU guerrilla diplomacy”, which requires EU Ambassadors to 
“stimulate consensus creatively and assertively”. 20 Quite remarkably, on looking 
further into the theoretical underpinnings of the idea of ‘guerrilla diplomacy’, I found 
it to be “both a diplomatic method and doctrine of statecraft”.21 Furthermore, “it is 
their capacity for total but subtle penetration that allows guerrilla diplomats to earn 
confidence and trust, mobilize support, and gain insights unavailable to others”.22 
These theoretical descriptions, which one assumes are known by respondent two, 
are very interesting. The implication is that the EU can use Lady Ashton’s quiet 
diplomacy in a new and innovative way to discover information to which others are 
not privy. Moreover, as a means of statecraft, such diplomacy will certainly enable 
the Heads of Delegation to sell the EU in the international arena, which, in turn, may 
legitimise the idea that the EU is ‘a state’ in its own right.  
 
                                                 
18 Interview with a newly appointed Head of Delegation, 11 November 2010.  
19 Interview with a newly appointed Head of Delegation, 9 November 2010. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Daryl  Copeland,  Guerilla Diplomacy: Re-Thinking International Relations, Boulder, Lynne 
Rienner, 2009, p. 205.  
22 Ibid., p. 208.  Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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Conclusions 
 
This essay has attempted to prove that despite the introductory quote’s claim to the 
contrary,  EU Ambassadors do exist, at least notionally. Through analysing a job 
description  for the EU Head of Delegation, Afghanistan, as well as Lady Ashton’s 
rhetoric, it subsequently suggested that these Ambassadors are supposed to be EU 
representatives that transcend nation-state boundaries, to mediate relations and 
promote the EU in international affairs. This notion was backed up by responses 
provided by two soon-to-be Heads of EU Delegations and we saw also that 
consensus building, flexibility and adaptability are core attributes to any EU 
Ambassadorial role. The idea of guerrilla diplomacy, posited by the second 
respondent, was then briefly discussed, and it is the final suggestion of this essay that 
this notion is in real need of further exploration. Is there a general consensus that the 
EU is quietly pursuing this “diplomatic method and doctrine of statecraft” to gain 
more power internationally?23 And if so, how will the world change with EU guerrilla 
diplomats mediating relations? As the EEAS is in its infancy, these questions are at 
present unanswerable. It will nonetheless be fascinating to track the progress of the 
EU’s diplomats, and in so doing to analyse the evolution of an entirely new creed.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23Daryl Copeland, op.cit. 31 
COREPER: A New Type of Effective Diplomacy  
Thomas Heidener 
 
The Council of Ministers has traditionally been considered the most important 
multilateral diplomatic forum of the European Union.1 It has, moreover, been noted 
that “being the most ‘unashamedly national of the EU institutions’, the Council is 
organised in a fashion ensuring specifically national, as opposed to supranational, 
inputs into the EU system of governance”.2 However, limiting the Council to the forum 
of  ‘hard’  bargaining is not necessarily  apt  since the Council is also a collective 
decision-making system with its own rules, norms and organisational culture.3 
 
Important in this respect are the negotiations within the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives  (COREPER).  COREPER, consisting of Member  State diplomats, is 
argued to play an essential role in enabling coordination of Member States’ policies 
at the Union level.4 By some estimates only 10-15 per cent of decisions are discussed 
at Ministerial level, indicating that COREPER is a relatively successful policy-making 
tool.5   
 
This essay analyses why COREPER is so effective at reaching agreement, despite the 
multitude of national interests it is faced with. I argue that multilateral negotiations in 
COREPER are undertaken in a novel diplomatic fashion which may explain why a 
relatively high number of intergovernmental decisions are concluded here. 
 
COREPER  
 
Before legislation is enacted, it is discussed in the relevant formation of the Council.6 
However, a large part of the Council’s work takes place  below  Ministerial level 
among diplomats from the EU’s Member States. Since almost all items on the Council 
agenda pass before COREPER,7 this part of the Council hierarchy merits special 
attention. According to Article 19 of the Council Rules of Procedure, “COREPER shall 
be responsible for preparing the work of the Council and for carrying out the tasks 
                                                 
1 Mika  Widgrén, “The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making”,  CEDifo 
Economic Studies, vol. 55, no. 1, 2009, p. 30.   
2 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, The Council of Ministers, London, Macmillan Press, 
1997, p. 211.  
3 Jeffrey Lewis, “The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative rivalry in 
the Council’s infrastructure”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 7, no. 2, 2000, p. 261. 
4 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen Wallace, op.cit., p. 141.  
5 Ibid., p. 40.  
6 Frank Häge, ”Who Decides in the Council of the European Union?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 46, no. 3, 2008, p. 535. 
7 To create a functional division of labour the Member States’ ambassadors meet in COREPER 
II dealing with more politically sensitive issues while their deputies meet in COREPER I dealing 
with more technical issues. See ibid.  Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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assigned to it by the Council”.8 This short definition covers a wide array of tasks, 
however, including undertaking preparatory discussions, giving detailed evaluations 
of the dossiers and suggesting options to the Ministers.9 Although the diplomats in 
COREPER never formally vote, they do, nonetheless, take decisions all the time. As 
the scope of the EU has widened and deepened, so too have the tasks of COREPER, 
which has gradually assumed de facto legislative competencies.10 
 
There seems to be a consensus in the literature that a relatively large number  of 
decisions are taken before reaching Ministerial level. Hayes-Renshaw estimates that 
only 10-15 per cent of decisions reach the highest level.11 Although other authors 
have found that a higher number of cases are discussed among Ministers – and that 
this number varies between policy areas – it is generally estimated that between 50 
and 90 percent of issues are resolved below Ministerial level. 12 This  suggests a 
relatively effective COREPER. This high effectiveness is puzzling since nothing suggests 
that COREPER is not merely another intergovernmental forum, constituted of 
diplomats instead of Ministers.  It therefore seems relevant to examine what 
distinguishes COREPER as a diplomatic negotiating forum. 
 
Diplomatic Appropriateness 
 
It is argued that a central precondition for the functioning of diplomacy, as a system 
of norms and rules regulating interstate relations, is the existence of a common 
institutional basis shared by all states.13 Diplomacy, according to this view, is seen as 
the expression of a transnational “logic of appropriateness”, where actors are 
guided by collective understandings of what constitutes socially acceptable 
behaviour.14 This enables diplomats from different countries to interpret events in the 
same way, thereby enhancing communications and enabling interstate negotia-
tion.15 According to the traditional logic of appropriateness, diplomats may share 
certain professional characteristics –  such as a corporate culture, professional 
language and behavioural codes – but are ultimately representatives of diverse and 
often competing national interests.16  
 
                                                 
8 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision of 22 March 2004 adopting the Council’s 
Rules of Procedure”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 106, 15 April 2004, p. 11.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Jeffrey Lewis, “The methods of community in EU decision-making”, op.cit., p. 264. 
11 Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Hellen Wallace, op.cit.  
12 Frank Häge, op.cit., pp. 538-543.  
13 Jozef Bátora, “Does the European Union Transform the Institutions of Diplomacy?”, ARENA 
Working Paper, vol. 3, no. 6, 2003, p. 3.  
14 Tanja  A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in 
Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 65. 
15 Jozef Bátora, op.cit., p. 6. 
16 Ibid., p. 1. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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In the following, specific mechanisms of COREPER will be examined which are 
argued to challenge this traditional logic of diplomatic appropriateness, as 
diplomats may come to share and defend common interests.  
 
Socialisation 
 
Ambassadors in COREPER II meet weekly, while their deputies in COREPER I meet on 
a twice-weekly basis. Due to the heavy workload of the meetings, they often last the 
entire day.17 In addition, the ambassadors and their deputies are Brussels-based, 
rather than travelling between their national capitals and Brussels.18 Therefore, they 
have their families in Brussels and may interact with each other during their spare 
time, too.19 As Egeberg has argued, the diplomats become embedded in EU level 
structures, since they are “separated in time and space from the primary institutional 
affiliations back home”.20 Moreover, many members of COREPER have been based 
in Brussels for numerous years, and thus know their counterparts extremely well. 
During their capacity as representatives they may spend well over a hundred days of 
the year together, especially towards the end of a Council Presidency period when 
the workload peaks.21  
 
In these dense and frequent interactions, mutual trust, a deliberative atmosphere 
and a feeling of togetherness is likely to arise. It is in this context that a socialisation 
effect may set in which modifies the behaviour and identities of actors, potentially 
creating ‘like-minded’ individuals who see themselves as having a stake in the EU.22 
According to Warntjen, this implies that diplomats do not simply feel bound to a 
national identity and loyalty to represent their Member  States but may also feel 
bound to a European identity and loyalty to common European interests. 23 This 
possibility of representatives being socialised to consider the common goals of 
agreement, is of particular importance for the effectiveness of decision-making. It 
helps avoid deadlock in the negotiations, as representatives have a feeling of 
responsibility for the EU and recognise that the national interest cannot always win. 
This may allow for common solutions to be found on even relatively delicate issues.  
                                                 
17 Jeffrey Lewis, “Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading? The Committee of 
Permanent Representatives and the Local Elections Directive”, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 36, no. 4, 1998, p. 482. 
18 Jeffrey Lewis, “How institutional environments facilitate co-operative negotiation styles in EU 
decision-making”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 17, no. 5, 2010, p. 655.   
19 Jakob Lempp and Janko Altenschmidt, “Supranationalization through Socialization in the 
Council of the European Union”,  Paper presented at the  Biennial Conference, European 
Union Studies Association, Montreal, 17-19 May, 2007, p. 10.  
20 Morten  Egeberg, “Transcending intergovernmentalism? Identity and role perceptions of 
national officials in EU decision-making”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 3, 1999, 
p. 470.  
21 Jeffrey Lewis, “The methods of community in EU decision-making”, op.cit. 
22 David Bostock, “Coreper Revisited”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, 
p. 217. 
23 Andreas Warntjen, ”Between bargaining and deliberation: decision-making in the Council 
of the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 17, no. 5, 2010, p. 670. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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Reciprocity 
 
Dense socialisation may also have an indirect effect on the decision-making 
capacity by indirectly contributing to reciprocity.24 Reciprocity can be either specific 
or unspecific. Specific reciprocity implies negotiations of package deals where a 
delegation accepts concessions on one issue in return for receiving its wishes on 
another issue. 25  As Berridge argues, package deals help avoid deadlock, as 
negotiation on a broad front “is more likely to break an impasse by increasing the 
scope for imaginative solutions”.26 Specific reciprocity is argued to be common for 
international institutions that allow for package deals to be made and is not 
necessarily specific for Council decision-making.27  
 
In contrast, it is especially the prevalence of diffuse reciprocity that distinguishes 
COREPER from other types of multilateral negotiations.28 According to Lewis, this type 
of reciprocity is a form of social capital which extends the ‘shadow of the future’ and 
may “reconcile self-interest and solidarity”.29 Diffuse reciprocity is not driven by the 
creation of package deals but by an informal rule based on high levels of mutual 
trust and understanding. Owing to the relatively enduring character of negotiations 
in COREPER and the long-term relation of diplomats, as described above, an 
institutional memory may arise where delegations can expect, that if they negotiate 
in a compromising way, other delegations will do likewise.30 Furthermore, diffuse 
reciprocity may be promoted by the horizontal nature of COREPER agendas which 
deal with a diverse range of issue areas. When a multitude of issues are discussed, 
participants cannot expect to demand that their wishes be fulfilled every time 
without showing some restraint, from time to time, in return.31  
 
In addition to socialisation, reciprocity –  especially diffuse reciprocity  –  should, 
therefore, have important positive consequences for decision-making effectiveness 
as well. Since members of COREPER can feel assured that their self-restraining 
behaviour will be repaid at a later stage, they should be more inclined to engage in 
cooperative negotiations, thus enhancing possibilities for agreement.  
 
The processes of socialisation and diffuse reciprocity at work in COREPER by no 
means exclude representatives’ pursuit of national interests coherent with the 
traditional diplomatic appropriateness outlined above. However, it does seem that 
the processes examined mean that diplomats learn to ‘play the game’ by different 
                                                 
24 Jakob Lempp and Janko Altenschmidt, op.cit., p. 15. 
25 Ibid., p. 11. 
26 G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 3rd 
edn., p. 49.  
27 Jakob Lempp and Janko Altenschmidt, op.cit., p. 12. 
28 Ibid., p. 12.  
29 Jeffery Lewis, “Is the ‘Hard Bargaining’ Image of the Council Misleading?”, op.cit., p. 487. 
30 Jeffery Lewis, “The methods of community in EU decision-making”, op.cit., p. 268. 
31 Ibid.  EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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rules, thereby challenging the traditional logic of diplomatic appropriateness which 
rests on norms and understandings of diplomats as the guardians and promoters of 
the national interest. According to the logic of appropriateness in COREPER, national 
diplomats are not solely defenders of the national interest but are also socialised and 
expected to defend the common interest. 
 
Before concluding on the essay’s findings, it is worth considering which kind of logic 
of diplomatic appropriateness may arise in the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). The service is composed of diplomats from the European Commission, the 
Council and the Member States and will have the mandate to ensure coordination 
and consistency of EU external action.32 As a consequence, a major task of the EEAS 
will be to create loyalty among EEAS staff to the EU in order for the Union to present a 
united face in international negotiations. With the above considerations in mind 
about the effects of socialisation and diffuse reciprocity, it would not seem to be an 
impossible task to ask diplomats to shift their loyalty from a national to a supra-
national institution. Whether the EEAS diplomats will then be fully loyal to the EU or 
split their loyalty between their Member State and the EU is hard to establish now. This 
will likely depend on career structures within the EEAS where permanent agents are 
more likely to be loyal to the EU first and foremost than seconded staff from the 
Member  States.33 This raises the interesting possibility that the logic of diplomatic 
appropriateness will vary according to the staff in the EEAS with permanent staff 
developing a more traditional logic of appropriateness being guided primarily by the 
EU interest, while seconded staff split their loyalty between the EU and their Member 
State, thereby being guided to a higher degree by the novel type of diplomatic 
appropriateness uncovered in COREPER. 
 
Conclusion  
 
COREPER offers an insight into a unique diplomatic negotiating environment. Owing 
to its familiarity and togetherness, COREPER has the potential to socialise diplomats 
into becoming like-minded actors who negotiate with each other in a deliberative 
atmosphere characterised by mutual trust and willingness to compromise. In such an 
environment diplomats understand the positions of their counterparts and know that 
concessions made will be repaid later. Therefore, this essay has argued that a novel 
type of logic of appropriateness characterises COREPER which emphasises a 
common interest next to the national one. This makes deadlock and hard bargaining 
less common, explaining why COREPER is relatively effective at reaching agreement 
despite the multitude of national interests it is faced with. 
                                                 
32 Sarah Wolff and Adriaan Schout, “EU Agencies and their External Relations – Which Way 
Forward From a Legitimacy Perspective?”, Paper prepared for the workshop EU Agencies 
and their External Relations, Which Way Forward, The Hague, 10 June 2011, p. 4.  
33 Edoardo Ongaro, “Building the European External Action Service after the Lisbon Treaty: 
Reflections on Some Key Organizational Issues”, SDA Bocconi School of Management, 2010, 
p. 13. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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A new type of diplomatic appropriateness in COREPER does not necessarily imply 
that the traditional logic of appropriateness will cease to exist since most interstate 
negotiations today are not conducted in surroundings comparable to those of 
COREPER. The above observations could merely imply that the way diplomacy is 
carried out varies according to how dense interstate cooperation is.  
 37 
Representing ‘Europe’ Abroad? Cohesion and Socialisation Processes of the 
European Diplomatic Community  
Charles Thépaut 
 
In various regions of the world diplomats represent EU Member States and defend 
their interests. Beyond obvious cultural proximity, European integration has created 
obligations for them to cooperate with each other1 in a way that seems to go 
beyond traditional collaboration within a diplomatic corps. In this regard, considering 
the vast literature about the specific features of Member State diplomacy in Brussels,2 
the question arises whether cooperation between Member State diplomats posted in 
third countries has changed the nature of diplomatic practices and if these changes 
could eventually enable the EU to speak in the world with a more unified voice. 
Hence, this essay asks to what extent European integration in the field of external 
action is changing the nature and the practices of the European diplomatic 
community abroad.  
 
On the basis of summaries of the coordination meetings organised in Syria by the 
French rotating presidency of the EU in the second semester of 2008, this essay will 
take as a case study Member State diplomats posted in Damascus. It will use Sharp’s 
definition of a diplomatic corps3 to argue that Member State diplomats have acted 
as a bloc self-conscience of its specificity. Because of the intergovernmental nature 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Member State sovereignty does 
not seem to be harmed in the process, but using Adler-Nissen’s concept of ‘late 
sovereign diplomacy’4 will nevertheless be a useful analytical tool to identify the 
nature of Member State diplomats’  practices and to discuss whether they  have 
started forming a ‘late sovereign diplomatic corps’. The essay will first describe the 
nature of cooperation of Member State diplomats in Damascus in order to discuss to 
what  extent the European diplomatic corps is a replication of Brussels’ ‘late 
sovereign’ diplomatic order and how the Lisbon Treaty will influence this process.  
 
A Group of Friends or Diplomatic Bloc?  
 
In Damascus, the European diplomatic community has in 2008 been composed of 
diplomats from 21 Member States and the Commission. As rotating presidency, the 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Note, Lignes 
directrices en matière de protection consulaires des ressortissants de l’UE dans les pays tiers, 
Bruxelles, 16 June 2006. 
2 See, for instance, David Spence “The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct of 
European Union Affairs”, in Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries in the 
European Union: Integrating Diplomats, New York, Palgrave, 2005, pp. 18-36. 
3 Paul  Sharp  and  Geoffrey  Wiseman, “The Diplomatic Corps in Constituting International 
Society”,  in Paul  Sharp and G. Wiseman (eds.), The Diplomatic Corps as an Institution of 
International Society, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 265-277. 
4 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Late Sovereign Diplomacy”, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 
4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 121-141. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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French Embassy organised coordination meetings, study trips and official events with 
Syrian officials for this group of diplomats.5 Designed on a hierarchical basis and a 
thematic one,6 with the presence of Commission representatives, the coordination 
meetings could be seen as a local replication of Brussels’ order in foreign policy in 
the sense that CFSP is mainly coordinated on an intergovernmental basis by the 
Council of Ministers.  
 
During these meetings, Member State diplomats in Syria have dealt together with 
political and technical issues in a way that goes beyond the traditional exchange of 
views diplomats usually have.7 For instance, during consular meetings, elements such 
as the harmonisation of social insurance for local staff or information about local visa 
falsification have been discussed and shared.8 During  human  rights meetings, the 
attendance of European diplomats at political opponents’ trials has been organised 
in order to assure a permanent, highly symbolic European presence at these trials. 
These meetings of Member State and Commission diplomats on a regular basis, in 
addition to their bilateral and multilateral meetings,  in a way formalises their 
existence as a specific bloc much stronger than any other alliance of countries. 
 
Some of this cooperation is part of the obligations implied by European regulations,9 
but part of it is field cooperation between professionals facing the same difficulties. 
For instance, it has been agreed during a consular meeting that the French Embassy 
would use its good relations with Syria10 to address its authorities on the behalf of all 
EU Member States about their need of improved information when an EU national 
was arrested. The French Embassy also organised official lunches with all Member 
State Heads of Missions and Syrian officials in order to express European concerns as 
well as study trips outside Damascus for all Deputy Heads of Missions in order to 
develop a common or shared understanding of the Syrian context.11 In both cases, 
the  French Embassy  used the weight of the European diplomatic bloc to direct 
dialogue more often with Syrian officials and local dignitaries.    
 
                                                 
5 Charles  Thépaut, “Représentation de la PFUE en Syrie -  Rapport de Stage”, IEP de Lille, 
November 2009, p. 10. 
6  Ambassadors, Deputy Heads of Missions, Human Rights, Administrative and Consular 
Aaffairs, Culture, Military Attachés, Economic Attachés.  
7 Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialog between States, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 128. 
8 French Embassy to Syria, Working Document, Compte-rendu de la réunion consulaire du 
11/09/2008, Damascus, September 2008. 
9 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, op.cit.  
10 Following President Nicolas Sarkozy’s election, renewed high-level contacts took place 
between France and Syria, especially during the French Presidency of the EU. This put an end 
to the period of isolation of Syria that had followed the assassination of Rafic Hariri. French 
diplomats were consequently in a better position to negotiate technical issues with Syrian 
authorities than other diplomats whose countries were still cautious about Syria.  
11 Charles Thépaut, op.cit. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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Sharp argues that a diplomatic corps is the most “salient” when countries “value their 
relations with each other more than with their host country”. 12 Member State 
diplomats’  in Damascus gave a clear expression of this by ‘Europeanising’ 13 
themselves and their diplomatic practices, and therefore acting as a European 
diplomatic corps. This  situation was largely influenced by the French Embassy’s 
activism due to its national agenda in Syria. However, the most important point here 
is that this interest led to create a specific diplomatic pattern which gave a 
distinctive nature to the European diplomatic corps. Moreover, one can argue that 
the European diplomatic corps’ cohesion also resulted from the difficulties that all 
Member States  encountered bilaterally with Syrian authorities, where a  lack of 
cooperation was making diplomatic work complicated 14  and gave additional 
incentive for European solidarity.  
 
Between Traditional and ‘Late Sovereign’ Diplomacy: The Lisbon Treaty 
 
Although significant in the way it created extensive cooperation, the European 
diplomatic corps cannot be seen as changing the relations of the corps with their 
country to the same extent as the one described by Adler-Nissen.15 Compared to the 
rather ‘disintegrated’ national representations in Brussels,16 the institutional environ-
ment of Member State mbassies is much clearer and more traditional. Member State 
diplomats do not navigate between emerging European diplomacy and nationally 
generated international policy17 because they are not involved in a permanent 
negotiation process like in Brussels,  and their instructions almost only come from 
Foreign Ministries’ headquarters. 18  The former prevents any ‘delocalisa-tion of 
national interests’19 and the latter highly limits possibilities of ‘territorial’20 disputes. 
Following  national instructions, Member State diplomats  do not have to find 
agreement among themselves. Agreements have been made for them, and they 
are asked to engage third countries’ authorities, not European counterparts. 
European cooperation in third countries is thus not policy building but only coordina-
tion of policy implementation. This puts a large distance between Member State 
diplomats and the European state of mind. They can neither be concerned by the 
ambivalent intellectual position of people in Brussels,21 nor share their ‘theological’ 
stance.22 Member State diplomats remain “gatekeepers”23 because even when the 
                                                 
12 Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, op.cit., p. 267. 
13 Brian  Hocking  and  David  Spence, “Towards a European diplomatic system?”, in Brian 
Hocking and David  Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating 
Diplomats, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 287. 
14 Charles Thépaut, op.cit. 
15 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, op.cit. 
16 David Spence, op.cit., p. 33. 
17 Brian Hocking and David Spence, op.cit.  
18 Charles Thépaut, op.cit., p. 14. 
19 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, op.cit., p. 132. 
20 Ibid., p. 126. 
21 Ibid., p. 131. 
22 Ibid., p. 129. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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agenda is shared among Europeans, each diplomat is working on national goals in 
the receiving country. Dealing with European partners is just a way to do so.   
 
As such, there is thus no ‘late diplomatic corps’ but the European diplomatic corps 
abroad might be on its way to build a distinctive sovereign order in between a 
traditional and a late sovereign one. With the Lisbon Treaty, the centre of gravity is 
likely to shift from the traditionally dominant national one, the respective Embassy of 
the rotating presidency, towards the supranational level, encapsulated by the EU 
Delegation.  In this regard, the EEAS has the potential to act locally as the 
supranational layer that fostered the process in Brussels.24 
 
Supranational coordination is crucial in a late sovereign order because it forces 
sovereign states to adapt their agenda and preferences to the new structure.25 Prior 
to  the  Lisbon  Treaty, the Delegation’s diplomatic role was strictly limited to the 
European Commission’s areas of competence and its influence on the European 
diplomatic corps  was thus relatively low. 26 Now the Delegation can act as the 
representation of the EU and will therefore coordinate the European diplomatic 
corps’ activities and balance its national dimension. This structural change will lead 
to a further ‘Europeanisation’27 of external representation and diplomatic practices 
by upgrading the existing cooperation between Member State  embassies. 
Moreover, if some Member States  reduce the size of their diplomatic network 
because of budget constraints, the EU Delegations are  likely to gain an even 
stronger position within the European diplomatic corps and challenge the traditional 
role of Member State embassies.28  
 
Although Member States will keep their sovereign margins in third countries as long as 
they keep an intergovernmental CFSP, diplomats sent from EU institutions and 
Member States  diplomatic services are likely to build within the EEAS distinctive 
socialisation patterns that should influence the entire European diplomatic corps in 
each third country and help build a common diplomatic culture. National features 
might stay strong as long as national embassies will exist but given the growing size 
and financial resources of EU Delegations, traditional patterns might be significantly 
challenged by the doxa29 likely to be developed by EEAS diplomats. Like in Brussels, 
Member States  are supposed to keep their sovereignty but the dynamics of the 
                                                 
23 Brian Hocking, “Gatekeepers and Boundary-Spanners – Thinking about Foreign Ministries in 
the European Union”, in  Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.), Foreign Ministries in the 
European Union: Integrating Diplomats, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 1-15.  
24 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, op.cit., p. 129. 
25 Ibid., p. 132. 
26 Charles Thépaut, op.cit., p. 27. 
27 Brian Hocking and David Spence, op.cit.  
28 Melanie Morisse-Schilbach, “France”, in Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.), Foreign 
Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 
123. 
29 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, op.cit., p. 122. EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011 
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cooperation/coordination process will de facto harm it, although not to the same 
extent as in Brussels because it cannot be as deep as in the Council’s headquarters.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The European diplomatic corps in Damascus and elsewhere is far from practicing 
‘late sovereign diplomacy’ and Adler-Nissen’s concept does not really apply to the 
institutional environment encountered by Member State diplomats outside the EU. 
However, European integration has shaped the way Member State diplomats act 
and although still heavily national, their diplomacy has been significantly European-
ised. In some areas, the European diplomatic corps’ cohesion has gone beyond the 
strict ‘coordination imperative’ 30  imposed by capitals and this has created a 
distinctive identity which will be significantly strengthened by the structural changes 
implied by the Lisbon Treaty. The ‘variable geometry’ of diplomatic networks31 and 
the interests of Member States  in each third country will make the  European 
diplomatic corps’ features very different from one country to another but it seems 
that each of them will more and more reflect a certain image of the European 
‘society’ to the same extent that an international diplomatic corps constitutes a 
certain image of the international society.32  
 
 
 
                                                 
30 Brian Hocking and David Spence, op.cit., p. 298.  
31 Ibid., p. 299. 
32 Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, op.cit. Paul Quinn (ed.) 
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